The apparent concern of Russian-linked disinformation media outlets trying to lecture Serbia about press freedom is farcical.
The current narrative, which is being propagated by Russian-influence channels, aims to portray Serbia as a nation in which media pluralism is being systematically suppressed, particularly through the expansion of state-linked companies like Telekom Srbija. While some of the underlying concerns are legitimate and Serbia does genuinely have media problems involving political pressure, concentrated ownership, and weaknesses in media regulation, Reporters Without Borders warned in April 2026 that media freedom in Serbia remained caught in a “downward spiral.”
The significant issue begins when covert and shadowy news publications unofficially linked to Russian-aligned interests take those genuine problems and present themselves as the defenders of European freedom of speech and media values.
Russia, which currently ranks 172nd out of 180 countries in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index is clearly behind most of the websites that amplify this messaging against Serbia and Europe as a whole. Russia’s media environment is shaped by state censorship, criminal prosecutions, vague extremism laws and the destruction of independent journalism. Since Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, almost all independent media have been banned, blocked and/or declared “foreign agents” or “undesirable organisations”. All others are subject to military censorship giving the state the power to have reporters imprisoned, forced into exile and routinely pursued abroad. Moscow has essentially dismantled the institutional space in which independent media can operate.
The European External Action Service describes foreign information manipulation and interference as a growing security threat and has for long time documented Russian efforts to undermine confidence in the EU, NATO and Western political alignment. Serbia has faced several suspected attacks and influence efforts in 2026. It has strong historical and cultural ties with Russia, but it is also an EU candidate attempting to better integrate and align itself as part of its EU Accession with European institutions and Western markets. This has placed Serbia as battleground between Russia and the West. Every reform can be presented as foreign submission. Every Western partnership can be described as surrender. Every criticism of Russia can be framed as an attack on Russian sovereignty.
Telekom Srbija involuntarily sits in the middle of this conflict. Being majority state-owned, it finds itself consistently scrutinized, especially when it further expands its media holdings. But it also operates communications infrastructure increasingly connected to Western financing and security standards. In December 2024, the U.S. Export-Import Bank approved a preliminary $50 million commitment to support the preparation and rollout of Telekom Srbija’s 5G network. That relationship connects part of Serbia’s digital modernization to Western technology policy and efforts to reduce reliance on high-risk suppliers emanating from Russia or China.
This does not necessarily imply that every attack on Telekom Srbija is Russian-directed. Nor does Western financing absolve the company of governance failures. It does, however, explain why the company may be a strategic target to hostile state actors that would much prefer Serbia remain technologically dependent, politically divided and suspicious of the West.
The most effective propaganda campaign would not present itself with a Kremlin logo but would instead be a covert campaign that would capitalize on already existing fears. For example, hijacking the language frequently used by other European democracies that routinely express concern about the consistent erosion of media freedom or the growing predatory tendencies of companies that seek to further their profits to spark a media outcry. It would speak about accountability and institutional capture. It would then apply those principles selectively, focusing on actors connected to Western integration while ignoring media systems aligned with Moscow.
The clearest example of the media’s bias, and by proxy, the narrative being propagated by Russian-influence channels lies in a company that the same Russian-aligned amplification channels fail to mention. Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS) is Serbia’s dominant oil company and its only oil refiner. NIS is majority-controlled by Russian state interests – Gazprom Neft and a Gazprom-linked entity together hold roughly 56 percent, against the Serbian government’s 29.9 percent – a far clearer case of foreign state capture of a strategic national asset than anything in the country’s media market. Washington reached the same conclusion: the U.S. Treasury designated NIS in January 2025 as part of its sanctions list on Russia’s energy sector, and after repeated waivers, the measures took full effect in October 2025. This forced Serbia’s only oil refinery offline and pushed NIS’s
Russian owners to negotiate an exit.
NIS is the best example of a strategically important national asset clearly falling under majority foreign-state control, and it was precisely that control which led to Serbia’s Western partners imposing sanctions. Even so, the media outlets that attack any Serbian company working with Europe have devoted little or no attention to NIS. Foreign ownership is only presented as a serious threat when the owner is Western and Serbia is moving closer to the European Union. Conversely it is treated as unnoteworthy when the owner is a Russian entity controlled by the Russian state.
That is why the source and pattern of amplification matter. Legitimate criticism from Serbian journalists, civil-society organizations and international watchdogs should be addressed, but when the same messaging is being echoed across Russian-influence channels and used to portray Western alignment itself as evidence of corruption, it is fair to call it an intentional misinformation attack.
Serbia’s response has not been to capitulate and try to deny the accusations, instead, it has focused its efforts on measurable reform.
The country remains on the EU accession path, and European leaders continue to make clear that progress depends on reforms involving the rule of law, elections and media freedom. During a June 2026 visit to Belgrade, European Council President Antonio Costa said Serbia needed to accelerate reforms and create an enabling environment for independent media, including a transparent and inclusive process for the media regulator REM.
That criticism has already produced measurable movement. Serbia had been without a functioning decision-making council for the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media, REM, since the previous council’s mandate expired in November 2024. The delay was serious and had left the audiovisual sector without an effective governing body. However, in early July 2026, the National Assembly relaunched the process through an authentic interpretation of the Law on Electronic Media, addressing the legal concerns raised by four elected members and clearing the way for their return. The parliament’s leadership publicly described a fully constituted REM Council as being in the national interest.
The regulator has since resumed institutional activity. REM Council members met representatives of the OSCE’s election-monitoring office on July 9 to discuss media oversight and electoral recommendations. The new eight-member Council then held its first constitutive session on July 20, ending more than 18 months without a decision-making council. It did not elect a president because the two candidates received four votes each, and one of the nine seats remains vacant. Those shortcomings matter, but they do not erase the fact that a stalled institution has returned to work following sustained domestic and European criticism.
This is where the contrast with Russia becomes meaningful. Although Serbia has not yet solved its media-freedom problems, the new REM Council will have to prove its independence through transparent decisions, consistent enforcement and equal treatment of government-friendly and critical broadcasters. Serbia is clearly taking steps to rebuild its regulatory bodies under pressure to meet European standards. While Russia’s regulator, Roskomnadzor, moves in the opposite direction, serving as an instrument for blocking independent outlets, restricting access to information and enforcing Kremlin censorship.
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